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Abstract 
All interested parties seem to agree that it’s important to be able to monitor public-sector 
performance at the sectoral level, but most current work based on multicountries databases 
doesn’t lend itself to country-specific conclusions. This is due to a large extent to major data 
limitations both on sectoral expenditures and on sectoral outcomes. This paper discusses the 
related issues and shows what we can do with the current data in spite of the drastic 
limitations. The main conclusion of the paper is that any efforts to assess country specific 
performances in relative terms are likely to be difficult in view of the data problems. A rough 
sense of performance across sectors can be estimated for groups of countries, allowing some 
modest benchmarking exercises. These estimates show that low income countries generally 
lag higher income countries significantly. However, efficiency has improved during the 1990s 
in energy and education but has not improved significantly in transport.  
 
 
*Correspondent author: Lourdes Trujillo CCRP, City University. Northampton Square, EC1V 0HB, London, 
email: ltrujillo@daea.ulpgc.es.  We are grateful to Tim Coelli, Ariel Fiszbein, Ana Goicoechea, Pablo Gottfret, 
Santiago Herrera, Kai Kayzer, Eduardo Ley, Harry Patrinos, Sergio Perelman, Pierre Pestiau, Anand Rajaram, 
David Saal, Philippe Vanden Eeckaut, and participants at a seminar sponsored by the U.K. Department for 
International Development for useful discussions and reactions at various stages of the preparation of this paper. 
These results represent our views and should not be attributed to the institutions with which we are affiliated. 
Any mistakes of fact or interpretation in this paper are ours alone.  
  
Introduction 
Fiscal adjustment programs always press governments to increase productivity. That pressure 
is generally summed up in two questions:  
• How much less could the government spend to achieve current sector-specific outcomes— 
namely, targets for water- or energy-access rates, infant mortality rates, or academic test 
scores?  
• How much better could these outcomes be, given the current levels of sector-specific 
public expenditures?  
These two questions are probably central to any diagnostic effort to determine the 
quality of public sector expenditures.1 Unfortunately, no country, rich or poor, seems to be 
able to provide a precise quantitative answer to these basic questions at the broad level of 
aggregation used for sectorwide assessments of needs and performance.2  
Until recently, accountability for the match between sector specific expenditures and 
the associated education, health and infrastructure service deliveries had not appeared to be a 
major concern for finance ministers or watchdogs of public sector performance, as long as 
total expenditure levels were assessed to be sustainable from a macroeconomic perspective.3 
This is obvious in the academic literature. Since the seminal paper by Devarajan, Swaaroop, 
and Zou (1996), few empirical papers have been published on the sectoral composition of 
public expenditure in developing countries—in spite of a growing interest among political 
scientists to document the impact of globalization on the behavior of governments.4  
Things are changing. There is indeed a growing concern for accountability, which in 
turn is stimulating academic and policy interest in detailed budgeting processes and hence on 
                                                 
1 See Pradhan (1996), for example.  
2 The equivalent questions are the bread and butter of a project-level cost-benefit analysis. But even then, the 
quantitative assessments in most developing countries often fall short of expectations in most of the sectors 
covered here.  
3  This lack of accountability for the level and effectiveness of service delivery also limits the ability of most 
private companies that are charged with delivering education, health, and infrastructure services (or any other 
good or service) to raise significant funds from the financial markets. 
4 There is, of course, a voluminous literature on sector-specific public expenditure—particularly in heath and 
education and in some dimensions of infrastructure, mostly telecoms. Although less vast, the literature on the 
distribution of expenditures between recurrent and capital expenditures is also illuminating. Among the few 
papers discussing allocation across sectors, the emphasis is on the distinction between productive and social 
sectors, focusing on some proxy for productive expenditure ignoring the relevance of the heterogeneity of the 
productive sector.  
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sectoral resource-allocation decisions.5 In the last three to five years, various governments 
within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—particularly 
the Australian, British, Dutch, Finnish, and Norwegian governments—have made significant 
progress toward linking expenditures and outcomes as part of their efforts to increase public-
sector accountability to taxpayers.6 Most of these countries have produced guidelines for their 
civil servants with varying amounts of sectoral detail but with enough incentives to begin 
measuring their activities as any business unit would. The public sector is importing long-
tested cost-accounting rules from the private sector—at least in some part of the activities of 
the public sector such as regulated industries. 
But progress is slow. Those leading the charge for change recognize quite explicitly 
(in widely available public documents) the limitations of their efforts.7 Although it would be 
overly simplistic, one could nevertheless argue that the two barriers to the implementation of 
new guidelines are posed, first, by governments that have never properly measured sectoral 
expenditures, and, second, by governments that have never measured sectoral outcomes well 
either! The problem is this basic, even in countries trying to produce quantitative assessments 
of public-sector performance. 
This is not to say there are no data. Every government has a budget. In fact, most 
governments also have “realized” budgets, reporting ex post their actual expenditures. But 
these budgets are usually intended only to ensure the macroeconomic sustainability of total 
government expenditures. They are not really designed to track down specific sectoral 
expenditures—or many other resources-allocation decisions for that matter, which is to say, 
the distribution between capital and recurrent expenditures. That is a problem for anyone 
trying to assess the cost-effectiveness of sectoral policies. 
The problem is not, however, only with expenditure or cost data. Measuring outcomes 
is also a serious problem. Once more, it is not that countries do not generate data on 
outcomes; it is just that the data are not really that helpful to get a sense of the effectiveness of 
sectoral resource allocation. The coverage of sectoral outcomes is always systematically 
partial both in terms of indicators of performance or results (e.g., the diversity of transport, 
health, or education services vs. infrastructures) and in terms of the dimensions of 
performance (e.g., performance should not only be measured in terms of quantity but also in 
terms of quality and affordability).  For instance, it is surprising to see that about 20 years 
                                                 
5 To be fair, this is not the first attempt at change. In the United States, for instance, the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 featured many aspects of legislation enacted over the past five years in a 
number of OECD countries. But the Act never really delivered much in terms of measurement or accountability.  
6 For an overview of OECD initiatives, see OECD, Country Facts Sheets, GOV/PGC (2006), April 6, 
JT03207081. The Atkinson Review may be the best documented such initiative, with its own website 
http: //www.statistics.gov.uk/about/data/methodology/specific/PublicSector/Atkinson/final_report.asp  
7 These government websites are the strongest evidence available to the international community. 
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after the so-called Water Decade was announced, no one is reporting the average quality of 
water delivered or the number of hours per day that water is available in given countries, or 
even in a representative sample of cities. 
Despite the data limitations, international benchmarking of sectorwide performances 
based on partial expenditure and outcome indicators is increasingly popular in the literature as 
a way to increase accountability. Most of the time, such benchmarking takes the form of 
ranking and country-specific performance assessments at the operator level—utilities, 
hospitals, schools, and so forth. The approach is quite common in the education and health 
fields.8 It is less common in the infrastructure sector, except perhaps for electricity, rail, and 
telecoms, where the availability of data has stimulated a wide range of publications.9  
The popularity of international benchmarking is, however, not universally supported, 
in particular when it is used to assess performance at the sectoral level. The critics are indeed 
strong.10 Some have very valid conceptual reservations. But most are concerned that the 
international benchmarking of sector-specific performance leads to the compilation of 
country-level data that can be used and abused when policies are formed. 
In this paper we try to generate some efficiency benchmarks—although at a higher 
level of aggregation than earlier efforts (which also sought to minimize the risks of 
misinterpretation identified by the critics).11 Based on the partial information available, we 
offer a rough answer to the second of the two core questions posed at the outset—how much 
more could governments achieve at their current level of expenditure?12 In the process, we 
document and discuss in some detail the data problems facing anyone seeking to make broad-
brush comparisons across country groups over time in each sector. More specifically, our 
paper makes three main contributions:  
• It provides an overview of sectoral public expenditures and outcomes by sector. 
• It gives a sense of the current levels of expenditure and of their efficiency for broad 
income groups of countries—low, lower-middle, upper-middle—in both developing 
countries and developed countries. 
• And it identifies areas in which government could improve its monitoring of public-sector 
performance in education, health, and infrastructure.  
                                                 
8 This would call for a long bibliography. A good substitute is to go through the Asian Development Bank-ADB-
- (2006), which provides a very nice overview of both efficiency measures on health and education and of the 
harsh criticism of these measures. 
9 See Coelli et al. (2003).  
10 See Ravallion (2005) for a good and incisive methodological critique of this literature. 
11 See ADB (2006) and Coelli et a,. (2003) for an overview of the previous research  
12 A precise answer is almost impossible to supply, as explained by Ravallion (2005) in his very tough essay on 
any effort to measure the efficiency of public expenditures.  
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Our approach is somewhat mechanical. Indeed, our main concern was to be as 
systematic as possible in collecting and validating all the cross-country data on the level and 
efficiency of public expenditure in the three sectors over 10–15 years—a relatively long 
period of time. Because the data on expenditure and outcomes are not generated from the 
same sources and because they cover different samples of countries, one of the main and most 
time-consuming challenges was to define expenditure and outcome indicators in a way that 
would allow us to maximize the number of countries and the number of years represented in 
the data base. We discuss this in detail later, but it is essential to keep in mind that the binding 
constraint on the coverage was the availability of data on public expenditure and matching 
data on outcomes. A country is included in the data base only if those data are available. The 
meagerness of this basic information is not the only issue. For a number of reasons discussed 
later, the exercise required some assumptions, in particular when measuring efficiency. The 
reassuring fact is that once all the data were processed, an interesting story emerged, even if it 
is a somewhat naïve story in view of the limitations just described. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data 
available on expenditure and outcomes. Section 3 reports the main comparative facts on 
expenditure levels and outcomes that could be generated from a basic statistical analysis of 
the data. Section 4 presents a rough assessment of the evolution of sector-specific efficiency 
levels for the four main groups of countries of concern here. The main objective of this 
section is to get as close as possible to benchmarking cross-country performances given the 
scanty data. Section 5 discusses the many limitations of the analysis while pointed to some of 
the potential uses of the available information. Section 6 concludes with some suggestions for 
further work and discusses specific information gaps the international community will have to 
address in its standardized international datasets.  
How much data are there, and what can you do with them? 
This section discusses the information we used to conduct large-scale cross-country and 
cross-sectoral performance comparisons of public expenditures. We conclude that these cross-
country assessments cannot match the quality of the analysis that could be achieved from 
country- or sector-specific studies conducted at the level of the business unit—central or local 
administration, school system, hospital, or water or electricity distribution company. Why? 
Because the data are simply not good enough to generate much more than “big picture” 
comparative assessments. The country coverage varies significantly across sectors and across 
time. The data are, however, good enough to give one a good sense of the evolution of the 
sectoral allocation of resources across broad, income-based country groupings over time.  
The basic data issues can be summarized as follows. In an ideal world, we would have 
had access to long-term and detailed public and private expenditure data on each subsector, 
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with matching data on all the relevant outcomes as well as all the relevant institutional 
variables, such as the degree of decentralization, the financing options, and other 
characteristics of the initial conditions with respect to the outcomes in each subsector. Those 
data do not exist.  
In the real world, the immensity of data problems is overwhelming. In fact, it proved 
to be impossible to produce a simultaneous assessment of multiple categories of public 
expenditures over a long period of time. First, such an assessment would require data on 
expenditure that would be consistent across sectors. The IMF Government Finance Statistics 
database (GFS) proved to be the only data source that achieved this consistency across 
sectors. GFS is the main data source for most empirical cross-country studies on government 
expenditures13; it is the only database offering comparable data on public expenditure for all 
countries in the world, including developing countries.  
This does not mean that the data are good. For instance, the GFS ignores a wide range 
of sectoral expenditures by public enterprises and other alternative public providers. It tends 
to have much better data on the central government than on subnational governments. For 
most countries, the data reported in this widely quoted publication tend to underestimate 
actual expenditure levels. In addition to the gaps in coverage, the GFS does not credit specific 
sectors for subsidies debited from general government expenditures to support sector-specific 
activities managed from the sectoral budget. In sum, any study relying on that data will be 
biased. Yet everyone uses the data, simply because they are the only set available.14
Second, many of the data are collected sporadically. The time coverage of 
expenditures and outcomes differs for many countries; in other words, inputs are available for 
some years and outputs for others. There are hardly any relevant data on sector-specific 
institutional characteristics. We thus had to pick between (i) maximizing the number of 
variables used, irrespective of time-coverage compatibility across countries and across 
subsectors, so as to minimize the loss of sample size, and (ii) getting the cleanest possible 
dataset, irrespective of the impact on the sample size. We adopted a hybrid solution. We gave 
up on presenting a number of outcomes available for only a few countries or years in favor of 
maintaining a reasonable sample size while accepting that the data quality and comparability 
would not be free from criticism.  
Third, because we were unable to generate useful country-specific data given the 
limited data coverage for each country, we focused on generating enough country coverage in 
four country-income groups: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and higher. These 
                                                 
13 The OECD and European Union have their own databases, which are widely used in the empirical literature 
but are of limited use here because there are no comparable data for developing countries. 
14 Note that the World Health Organization has started to generate its own expenditure series on health. It is more 
detailed and covers almost the whole world, but it does so only since 1998] 
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classifications turned out to be broad enough not to be influenced by any remaining country-
specific problems. The breadth also gives a sense of the gap that can exist among countries at 
different stages of development. The availability of time series on these broad groups was 
essential in the choice of countries and indicators because it also allowed us to track the 
evolution of this gap among country groups. 
With these limitations in mind, we were able to whittle the challenges down to the 
sector-specific issues. Relying on the IMF data for health and education is not a major 
problem because they explicitly identify these two categories. The problem is more serious 
for infrastructure, an expenditure category that does not exist in the GFS, which uses instead 
the categories of transport and “fuel and energy.” The sum of these two categories would be 
the closest to what is widely known as infrastructure but still would exclude the water and 
sanitation sectors as well as the telecom sector. The omission of the latter sector in this 
analysis is not a major problem because in most countries the associated expenditures are now 
broadly the private sector’s responsibility. The omission of water and sanitation is much more 
problematic, but it is not the only issue. Fuel and energy combines anything that would have 
to do with fuel exploration costs and leaves out the very significant role of utilities in the 
sector. The upshot is that the data allow only for a very partial view of the infrastructure 
sector.  
The time span is 1990 to 2002, although data are not available for every year of this 
period for every country. The data coverage available for each infrastructure subsector that 
can be matched with outcome data during that period is shown in table 1. The table 
distinguishes between general government and central government only to show that any 
effort to account for all expenditure sources has an overwhelming cost in terms of country 
coverage. It also shows how much more the coverage would drop if we wanted to cover the 
same specific countries for the two subsectors. Working with the central government data is a 
problem because the data on outcomes are poor. These data series are not ideal, but they are 
the only ones available to maintain a relatively large data sample at this stage.  
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 Table 1 Maximum coverage on expenditure with a matching outcome, 1990–2002 
 General government Central government 
 Number of 
observations 
Number of 
countries 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
countries 
Transport 50 21 606 84 
Energy and fuel 35 21 511 71 
Health 18 3 147 61 
Education 9 9 142 45 
Memo items: 
 Energy + Transport = Infrastructure 24 12 75 13 
 Health + Education = Social 2 2 49 36 
 Social + infrastructure 0 0 5 5 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics database.  
 
Looking at table 1, we reached the initial conclusion that we would be better off assessing 
the partial performance of governments in each subsector for as many of the years for which 
we have information.15 For instance, given the outcome data we have, efforts to cover energy 
and transport in the same country for the same years would limit our sample size to 13 
countries. For health and education, the sample size would be limited to 36 countries. Looking 
at sectors one by one allows us to work with at least 45 countries (education) and up to 84 
countries (transport). The specific countries covered for each sector are reported in the 
appendix. With this approach, there is enough data to generate the “big picture” country 
groupings (see table 2). 
Table 2 Number of observations available on central government expenditure per 
sector and per country grouping for the 1990–2002 period 
Country income 
category 
Transport Energy and fuel Health Education 
High-income 225 216 244 244 
Low-income 179 159 142 142 
Lower-middle-income 198 199 214 214 
Upper-middle-income 167 162 208 208 
Total 769 736 808 808 
 
The problems with the data have by now been well established. Still, we should report 
additional issues that emerged during our data-cleaning exercise. First, on the outcome side, 
                                                 
15 Another way to increase the sample size would be to look at blocks of years or to work with moving averages, 
recognizing that data are not available for every year. Another option could be to do some more sophisticated 
smoothing, involving Kalman filters or kernel estimators, but this would be a major project. 
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the international databases provide some of the outcome data in flows of services and some in 
stocks. Taking the changes in stocks (as in the case of roads) as an indication of services is, 
however, of limited interest because they do not necessarily reflect the services associated 
with the stock. Second, matching outcomes with expenditures is not as simple as it sounds. 
Capital expenditures are typically “oversized” in the short run because they are designed to 
meet long-term demand. We have no way of knowing, however, the average lead time of 
demand built in to the existing capital stock in any given year. There is thus a risk of 
overestimation of the efficiency problems simply because we are not picking up the timing 
issue properly. Third, the expenditure data are clearly problematic as well. To have a 
reasonable sample size, we need to work with central government expenditure data. We have 
no way of assessing correctly how much public-sector expenditure by subnational 
governments this assumption ignores. It should not be a major problem for infrastructure 
stocks because such a large portion is generally financed by the central government, not the 
entire government. It could be a much bigger problem for services, however, because 
subnational governments often take the responsibility for a fair share of those.  
The relevance of the private sector’s role is also ignored by the approach followed 
here because nobody really monitors this role in any of the sectors.16 Finally, there are very 
basic data issues. For many countries, we found data that did not pass some basic common-
sense tests, let alone basic statistical tests, whether on expenditure or outcome. We ended up 
dropping many countries because of this concern about data quality. We dropped a few more 
after the conversion of all the monetary data into purchasing power parity (PPP) because it 
also created outliers. The conversion to constant prices of data on energy and fuel was 
particularly problematic since a large proportion of the changes in expenditure levels can be 
traced to prices rather than quantities. 
Emerging facts on the evolution of central government expenditure 
Here we summarize the basic information on central government expenditures for the various 
sectors and the various country groupings. The country coverage for each subsector is shown 
in table 3. The distribution of countries across income groups is reasonably even, with 20–25 
countries for almost each group. The sample size for low-income countries is somewhat 
smaller (with 16 countries), but it is still statistically significant. 
                                                 
16 WHO may have the best set of data on the role of the private sector (in health),  and Calderon and Servén 
(2004) have the best data set, but only for investment in Latin America. There is no other quantitative cross-
country information on the relative importance of the private sector in any of the sectors covered here. There is 
actually very little qualitative information on this topic.  
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Table 3 Number of countries for which data are available on central government 
expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1990–2004 
Country income category Transport Energy and fuel Health Education 
High-income 25 23 24 23 
Low-income 16 15 16 16 
Lower-middle-income 23 22 23 23 
Upper-middle-income 22 20 23 23 
Total 86 80 86 85 
 
The sectoral expenditure levels for each category are presented in figure 1. It is 
important to keep in mind that these levels are at the lower bounds because they do not pick 
up any expenses by subnational governments or public enterprises. Figure 1 shows that for all 
developing-country groups, education represents the largest share of the central government 
expenditure analyzed here, with an average share of 3.1 percent—and up to 3.6 percent for the 
lowest-income groups. For high-income countries, health expenditure represents the largest 
share at 3.9 percent of GDP for our sample of high-income countries—the average for the full 
sample is 2.6 percent. The transport sector represents a nonnegligible interest of the public 
sector in all country groups, with an average across countries of about 1.5 percent of GDP. 
Figure 1:
Central government expenditure
 on sectors as a share of GDP
 (1990-2004)
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Figure 2 provides additional insights on the evolution of these shares over the past 15 
years or so. The emerging story is quite heterogeneous across sectors and income groups. 
Transport has seen its share of central government expenditure decline in all country groups, 
except upper-middle-income countries, where it has remained fairly stable following a slow 
upward trend. Fuel has followed a major downward trend except in low-income countries, 
where rising oil costs have has taken a toll on the budget. Education and health have been 
relatively stable except in low-income countries, where, after a decline, they have started to 
recover slowly. 
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Figure 2 Evolution of central government expenditure (share of GDP at constant 2000 prices) 
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It is clearly difficult to offer much more than a basic description of trends across 
categories. A much better analysis would consider all the major changes that have taken place 
in the organization of government in each country but this data is not available although we 
know it is relevant. Indeed, clear potential explanations for any changes observed over the 
past 15 years are the increased involvement of the private sector and of subnational 
governments in all of these sectors. Among national policies that might explain the changes 
are the deregulation or regulation of the sector and increased (or changed) demand for 
subsidies directed at the poor. However, very little data on these two dimensions has been 
collected in a comparable way across sectors.  
Supranational changes, too, would seem to be relevant in this regard; shifting priorities 
among bilateral and multilateral donors would probably contribute as much as shifts in 
national policies—some would argue that there is a strong correlation between the national 
and international changes. The supranational changes are particularly important for the 
poorest small countries, because such a large share of many of their investment programs is 
financed by donor loans and grants.  
The main point to be made here is that any assessment of the performance of 
governments based on international datasets is going to be limited by the lack of 
documentation of these sorts of institutional changes. Measuring reforms is as important as 
 10
measuring expenditures and outcomes and relating the results to a benchmarking exercise that 
compares the relative performance of governments. Nevertheless, we tried to ignore this 
limitation to get a sense of what the existing data could reveal in spite of the limitations. 
The emerging facts on outcomes 
To match the analysis of the basic statistics on sectoral expenditures, it may be useful to give 
a sense of the evolution of the outcome indicators for each of the subsectors. Table 4 offers a 
brief look at the specific outcome indicators with which we worked. As in the case of public 
expenditure, the data had great limitations. Ideally, we would have had a long list of outputs 
associated with each category of expenditure and a good idea of the average time lag between 
expenditures and expected outcomes. That kind of information is not available.  
Table 4 Outcome indicators 
Transport Energy Health Education 
Length of road 
network (km) 
Energy use per PPP 
GDP (kg oil equivalent 
per constant PPP$) 
Infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births) 
Primary completion rate 
(percent of relevant age 
group) 
Aircraft 
departures 
(number) 
Electric power 
consumption (Kwh/per 
capita) 
Under-5 mortality rate 
(per 1,000) 
School enrollment, primary 
(percent net) 
  Immunization, DPT 
(percent of children 
ages 12-23 months) 
School enrollment, 
secondary (percent net) 
   Repetition rate, primary 
(percent of total enrollment) 
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. 
 
The solution we adopted was again very pragmatic. We looked for outcome or output 
indicators that could be viewed as relatively useful proxies and for which data were available 
for the same countries and years for which we had expenditure data. The need to match 
country coverage with expenditures for all sectors for as many years as possible is what 
limited the sample sizes the most. Figure 3 provides a visual sense of the evolution of these 
indicators across income groups.  
The figures are clearly intended to give only a very general sense of the evolution of 
outcomes.17 In fact, this evolution and the relative position of each income group may be the 
only two useful contributions of these figures. Both are consistent with expectations—that is, 
higher-income groups do better than lower-income groups in each sector, and in general 
outcomes are improving over time across income groups. There are clearly problems with 
                                                 
17 An important detail to keep in mind is that some of the outcomes are defined in positive terms (more is better, 
e.g., completion rates) and some in negative terms (less is better, e.g., mortality). 
 11
some of the data series in some of the years; in addition, some of the significant increases in 
coverage that seem to take place in one year are hard to explain unless something is wrong 
with the datasets for those specific years. These problems are not damaging enough to 
question the emerging big picture on the evolution of outcomes per income groups. 
Figure 3 Evolution of sectoral outcome indicators by country groups, 1990–2003 
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 Some rough efficiency measures 
This section provides some illustrative estimates of the efficiency levels achieved by the 
central government in delivering sectoral services. We report only the results that are 
reasonably robust. We tried many combinations of sectors. In particular, we tried to assess the 
multiple output responsibilities of government (education, health, and infrastructure). 
Unfortunately, the data problems prevented us from producing the multisector analysis we 
had hoped for. 
We ended up focusing on four sector specific panels of data (table 5). For each panel, 
we estimated two models. The first is the simplest possible distance function. The second is a 
model corrected to account for institutional variables such as the quality of the bureaucracy 
and the level of corruption in the country. The models generate a measure of efficiency at the 
country level, but because we believe that country-specific data often are not reliable, we only 
report the aggregated data at the country-group level. 
 
Table 5 Panel used in the estimation for each sector 
Panel Sector Number of 
countries 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
outputs/outcomes 
Number of 
inputs a
4 Transport 81 547 2 1 (4) 
5 Energy 66 481 2 1 (3) 
7 Health 60 146 2 1 (1) 
9 Education 36 103 3 1 (1) 
Note: Any difference with table 1 is due to the fact that table 1 is based on a matching of outputs and inputs, 
whereas table 5 adds matching for the availability of data on corruption and bureaucratic quality. 
a. The first number is the number of expenditure categories; the second (in parentheses) is the number of control 
variables used in a second group of regressions (i.e., corruption, quality of bureaucracy, GDP, population, 
GDP/capita.) 
 
These datasets are used to estimate a distance function, which is then used to generate 
the efficiency estimates for each sector. The empirical application of a distance function 
requires the specification of an appropriate functional form. We rely on a translogarithmic 
functional form (hereinafter translog) because it is flexible, easy to calculate, and allows the 
imposition of the homogeneity condition for outputs (homogeneity of level 1 in outputs). It 
offers a flexible functional form providing a local second-order approximation to an unknown 
functional form. In other words, we made no assumptions regarding a priori restrictions about 
production technology. Finally, we specify an output orientation in the results reported here. 
In other words, we try to assess the extent to which with the current level of public 
expenditures (the input), we can achieve more outputs.  
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Formally, the function can be expressed as follows:  
   (1) 
it
T
t
tt
H
h
hh
K
k
K
k
K
k
M
m
mitkitkm
K
l
litkitklkitk
M
m
M
n
nitmitmn
M
m
mitmO
fd
yxxxx
yyyD
εγψ
δββ
ααα
++
+++
+++=
∑∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑∑
==
= = = ==
= ==
11
1 1 1 11
1 11
0
lnlnlnln2/1ln
lnln2/1lnln
 
Where y is a vector of M outputs, x is a vector of K factors, i relates to the i-th country, 
t relates to the time trend, h refers to the environmental/institutional variables, Ψt is the 
coefficient of the environmental/institutional dummy variables d, γt is the coefficient for the 
time dummy f, and εit is an error term. Variables are expressed in relation to their deviation 
from the geometric mean; therefore, the estimated coefficients can be construed as elasticities 
at the sample mean.  
In order to determine the frontier, Do needs to be equal to 1. When that is the case, the 
left side of the equation will equal zero (i.e., ln 1=0). This is why we need to assume 
homogeneity of degree 1. This condition is imposed by normalizing the distance function with 
one of the outputs. 18 This starts from the assumption that homogeneity implies that:  
 
 ( ) ( )yxwDwyxD OO ,, =   (2) 
 
for any w>0. The output chosen does not influence the results (Cuesta and Orea 2002). 
If in a translog distance function any output is chosen, say yM, so that w = 1/ yM, then 
the following expression results:  
 
   ( ) ( )δβα ,,,ln , MitititMO yyxTLyD =      (3) 
 
yielding the final expression:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )OMitititMit DyyxTLy ln,,,ln , −=− δβα   (4) 
 
The –ln (DO) term can be interpreted as an error term that captures technical 
inefficiency.  
                                                 
18 This approach is quite common now. It has been applied recently by Coelli and Perelman, 1999, 2000 or Orea, 
2002, among others.  
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The distance function estimated is stochastic. We decided to rely on an econometric 
estimation rather than on a nonparametric approach simply because the quality of the data was 
so poor and the number of outliers so great that we needed to be able to conduct a minimum 
number of tests to check the robustness of the results. Most of these tests are not available for 
the nonparametric approaches. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that the 
nonparametric models are much more sensitive to outliers in the assessment of efficiency 
levels.  
To estimate equation (4), the random disturbance term needs to be determined. The 
most common method to do so was developed by Battese and Coelli (1988) for panel data. It 
applies an additive term as suggested by Cuesta and Orea (2002) to account for the fact that 
we are estimating an output-oriented distance function. The error terms thus have the 
following form 
 
 iit uv +   (5) 
 
where vit is a symmetrical error term, iid with a zero average (which represents the random 
variables uncontrollable by the government), and ui is a one-sided negative error term (which 
measures the technical inefficiency of each operator that is constant over time) and is 
distributed independently of vit.  
Applied to the distance function, this yields  
 
 ( ) ( ) iitMitititMit uvyyxTLy ++=− δβα ,,,ln ,   (6) 
 
This equation can be estimated by the maximum-likelihood method, which requires 
distributional assumptions concerning the random shock. This assumes that vit follows a N (0, 
σv2) distribution and ui follows a │N (0, σu2)│distribution (Ritter and Simar 1997). We 
estimated the models with and without the environmental and institutional variables, but 
neither made a difference to the estimated efficiency levels. In other words, our proxies for 
the quality of bureaucracy and corruption were not statistically significant. The most 
interesting result is that while the expenditure levels are significant in all our final models, the 
associated elasticities are all quite low (below 0.05). The trend variables, however, are 
statistically significant. The trend variable is surprisingly negative in transport but positive in 
energy and insignificant in health and education, illustrating the differences in the importance 
of technological change across sectors.  
Table 6 presents a summary of the average efficiency levels estimated for each sector 
for the 1990–2002 period. It does not make much sense to compare sectors or to try to infer 
meaning from the efficiency estimates because the specific levels in each sector are largely 
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driven by the quality of the data and the specific measures of outputs and inputs used to 
estimate the model. In sum, the models are not really that useful in answering the original 
questions about the scope for improvement in outputs or in costs across sectors. 
 
Table 6 Average efficiency levels (1990–2002) 
Country income 
categories 
Transport Energy Health Education 
High-income 0.36 0.59 n.a. 0.93 
Low-income 0.33 0.23 n.a. 0.74 
Lower-middle-income 0.29 0.30 n.a. 0.92 
Upper-middle-income 0.37 0.32 n.a. 0.91 
 
Because we could not really come up with a reasonably good model for health, we do 
not report the results from the time-series analysis, although we will discuss results from a 
cross-section of 192 countries at the end of this section.19 Within each of the other sectors, 
however, the supporting econometric results are robust enough, and a story can be squeezed 
out for each subsector. That story differs across the subsectors. A discussion of the evolution 
of each of these for each country group generates a fuller picture of the global evolution of 
government expenditure. Figure 4 provides a graphical presentation of this evolution. The 
main potential use of these results is to get a sense of the relative efficiency levels, even if it is 
sometimes useful to ignore some of the outlier years. 
                                                 
19 The estimated model has the wrong signs on some of the parameters.  
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Figure 4 Evolution of levels of efficiency of government expenditure, 1990–2002 
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In transport, the story is driven by what happens in the road sector. Given that support 
for the roads sector is one of the largest sources of public expenditure in transport, the general 
results should not be too far from what would have been generated using a full set of 
information on public expenditures. The main story emerging is that there are no statistically 
significant differences across income groups. The richer countries do a little bit better, but this 
is to be credited mostly to the much higher level of air traffic picked up in our second output 
for transport. 
In energy, the story is very different. The performance levels differ sufficiently across 
income groups to imply some relevance. On the one hand, the poorer the countries, the more 
likely it is that the expenditure composition will be dominated by investment. On the other 
hand, the richer the country, the more likely it is that operation and maintenance expenditures 
will drive the story. Ideally, we should be able to assess the efficiency of capital expenditures 
(Capex) and operational expenditures (Opex) separately, as is done for private utilities under a 
price cap regime, but the data needed to do that do not exist at this level of aggregation. There 
are other problems as well. For instance, the fact that the cost of fuel is picked up in the 
assessment may distort the story, in particular given that the expenditure levels are expressed 
in constant prices. But this should not be sufficient to explain the nearly three times difference 
between the poorest and richest countries. In spite of the data problems, the upshot of our 
results is that even if there seems to be a clear scope for improvements in efficiency, the 
poorest countries are catching up to some degree.  
For education, there are differences across income groups, but these are predictable 
given the indicator used and that quality considerations are not well modeled. The most 
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interesting contribution of this naïve analysis may simply be the visual confirmation that the 
poorest country group shows signs of catching up. The trend in efficiency is indeed increasing 
significantly over the 12-year period covered by the sample. 
Although the panel data and models for health proved to be too unreliable to deserve 
much coverage here, we relied on the latest data offered by WHO (2005) to generate a 
comparison across income groups. We used the general theoretical production function as 
with the panel data, but focused on different inputs and outputs. We considered two outputs, 
life expectancy at births for males and for females, expressed in years. For inputs, we relied 
on one of the following variables: per capita government expenditure on health or total 
expenditure on health. The data on output were for 2004; on inputs, for 2003. All monetary 
variables are expressed in U.S. dollars and PPP. The results are not significantly affected by 
the choice of the input variable, as seen in figure 5. 
Once more the average efficiency level estimated for the sector is not that helpful, 
either because of its specificity to the model or the gaps in relevant information, but the 
relative position of the various income groups is interesting and has proven quite robust to the 
various models we tried (as it was with the models relying on panel data). The only problem 
is that we cannot track the evolution of efficiency. As in energy or education, the results are 
expected. The highest-income countries have the highest efficiency levels, and the lowest-
income countries the worst. Somewhat surprisingly, income level is not a perfect predictor of 
efficiency as defined here, since the upper-middle-income countries did somewhat worse than 
those in the lower-middle-income group in 2004. The important gap, however, is that between 
the lowest income groups and the other groups.  
Figure 5 Efficiency of health expenditure in 2004 
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Overall, this section tells us simply that in the poorest countries there is more scope 
for performance improvements in all sectors than in higher-income countries. This is not 
really news. Moreover, because the specific performance levels are driven by the choice of 
models and outputs, they should not be taken at face value. The only thing that comes out 
strongly enough is that the differences across income groups are significant and that in 
education and in energy at least, the lower-income countries are not catching up very quickly, 
at least for the outcome measures with which we worked.  
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Concluding comments 
It may be useful to conclude by returning to the two questions presented at the outset of this 
paper. Roughly, they are: How much more can the government do in each sector with its 
current resource allocation? And how much cheaper could today’s level of intervention be? 
Based on the data and analytical work reported here, the precise answer to these questions 
remains: we do not know. A more imprecise, but probably still safe, answer would focus on 
the wedge between the poorest countries and the others, arguing that there is evidence of 
significant gains to be achieved considering the differences in efficiency levels across income 
groups. With the models we used, it was in energy and education that the performance of the 
low-income countries fell furthest below the benchmark set by the higher-income groups.  
By how much could performance improve? Once more, the honest answer is: we do 
not know—not much help to policy makers. In these days in which quantitative targets of any 
type seem to be popular—from the Millennium Development Goals to the number of rules 
and regulations thought to impede business—this is probably not an acceptable reply for the 
donor community. It may be useful to consider setting a target for efficiency improvements—
making the strong assumption that the international community can manage to agree on the 
inputs and outputs to consider and then to collect the relevant data. A look at the numbers 
would suggest that a short-to medium term improvement in both sectors of 25 to 35 percent 
over current levels would not be an unrealistic lower-limit target, at least in terms of the 
outputs identified here. 20
At the sectoral level, the scope for improvement across income groups seems to be 
largest in infrastructure sectors. This is particularly clear for transport, where the use of a 
stock variable (instead of a services variable) is a clear problem when setting targets. 
Investments in these sectors are amortized in a much slower way than in education or health. 
Larger initial investments appear to be less efficient early in the life of a project. Because we 
do not know the average age of the capital stock in question, it is probably safe to stick to a 
lower limit for any target. This is what justifies a 25 to 35 percent improvement even when 
current efficiency levels appear to be only around 30 percent in energy and transport and it 
would seem possible to triple current outcomes.  
Ultimately, these numbers are presented as a conservative lower boundary to get a 
global sense of where country groups are. But they can hardly be used to make country-
specific recommendations. The technical problems underlying these numbers are not minor, 
and a lot more work would be needed before a more robust “guestimate” could be generated 
from the current data. In spite of all the good research that has been published, very little has 
                                                 
20 This is clearly an arbitrary target but it offers a rough realistic order of magnitude. 
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offered quantitative evidence suitable for use in fiscal diagnostics. A number of technical 
directions should be explored to refine significantly the results presented here.  
The simplest solution would be to test the model on a cross-section dataset made up of 
the latest data available—as we did for health with the WHO data. By doing this, one would 
obtain a useful snapshot from relatively large datasets. But it would not say much about the 
extent to which the poorest are catching up and at what speed. If we want to get a sense of the 
speed at which things are changing or could change, we need dynamic models. To meet that 
requirement we could use, for the four sectors, a pure output-expansion model in which the 
inputs would be used in a second stage to explain differences in efficiency. If a weak or 
negative relation appeared, we would need to test some alternatives—for example, to group a 
year in windows analysis (for instance, the mean of year 1 and 2 compared with the mean 
output of year 2 and 3). If this alternative setting were again inconclusive, it is unlikely that 
much more could be achieved than what has already been done here. Alternative solutions 
along the same line would be to look for cost drivers or to work with national accounts data to 
increase cross-country and intrasector consistency, since the omission biases are likely to be 
less dramatic with those datasets. The challenge there would be to unbundle the public- from 
the private-sector providers.  
In sum, as evidenced by the long list of papers included in the bibliography, some 
things can be done better than what we presented here, at least for education and possibly for 
health. Unfortunately, any recommended use of these sorts of assessments for country-
specific policy purposes will have to be presented with extremely heavy words of caution. 
Ultimately, policy-relevant work should be conducted at the level of the business unit in each 
country, but this requires a lot more data than are currently available because, historically, 
monitoring the performance of the government at the sector level has not really been anyone’s 
top priority. Until the international community begins to recognize that the sectoral allocation 
of public expenditure matters, today’s data gaps are unlikely to disappear and the monitoring 
of the performance of the public sector will continue to be only moderate at the aggregate 
level and superficial at best at the sectoral level. 
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 Appendix Countries included in sector samples 
Transport Energy and fuel Health Education 
Albania 
Argentina 
Australia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
China 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Ireland 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Ireland 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Albania 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
China 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Dominican 
Republic 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Albania 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Republic 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Seychelles 
Slovak Republic 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB  
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Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela, RB 
Zimbabwe  
Panama 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Thailand 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
Zimbabwe  
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation
Seychelles 
Slovak Republic 
South Africa 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela, RB 
Zimbabwe  
 
 22
References 
Afonso, A., L. Schuknecht, and V. Tanzi. 2006. “Public sector efficiency: Evidence for new 
EU member states and emerging markets.” European Central Bank, Working Paper 
581. 
———. 2005. Public sector efficiency: An international comparison.” Public Choice 123 (3–
4): 321–347. 
———. 2006. “Quality of public finances and growth.” European Central Bank, Working 
Paper 538. 
Afonso, A., and [[Name or initial dropped here? ]] St. Aubyn. 2005. “Non-parametric 
approaches to education and health efficiency in OECD countries.” Journal of Applied 
Economics 8 (2): 227–246. 
Agell, J., T. Lindh, and H. Ohlsson. 1997. “Growth and the public sector: A critical review 
essay.” European Journal of Political Economy 13 (1): 33–52. 
 ———,. 1997. “Growth and the public sector: A reply.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 15 (2): 359–366. 
Al-Samarrai, S. Forthcoming. “Achieving education for all: How much does money matter?” 
Journal of International Development. 
Anand, S., and M. Ravallion. 1993. “Human development in poor countries: On the role of 
private incomes and public services.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1): 133–
150. 
Asian Development Bank. 2006. Key indicators 2006: Measuring policy effectiveness in 
health and education. Manila 
Atkinson, A. 2005. The Atkinson Review: Final Report: Measurement of government output 
and productivity for the national accounts. Basingstoke, Hampshire, and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. http: 
//www.statistics.gov.uk/about/data/methodology/specific/PublicSector/Atkinson/final_report.asp
Battese, G. E., and T. J. Coelli . 1995. “A model for technical inefficiency effects in a 
stochastic frontier production for panel data.” Empirical Economics 20: 325–333. 
——— . 1988. “Prediction of firm-level technical efficiencies with a generalized frontier 
production function and panel data.” Journal of Econometrics 38: 387–399 
Battese, G. E., and G. S. Corra. 1977. “Estimation of a production frontier model: with 
application to the pastoral zone of eastern Australia.” Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 21: 169–179. 
 23
Bidani, B. and M. Ravallion. 1997. “Decomposing social indicators using distributional data.” 
Journal of Econometrics 77: 125–139. 
Bose, N. M., Emranul Haque, and D. R. Osborn. 2004. “The composition of public 
expenditure and economic growth in developing countries.” Global Journal of 
Finance and Economics 1 (1): 97–117. 
Calderon, C. and L. Servén. 2004. "Trends in infrastructure in Latin America, 1980-2001," 
Policy Research Working Paper Series 3401, The World Bank. 
Cherchye, L., and W. Moesen. 2004. “Institutional infrastructure and economic performance: 
levels vs. catching up and frontier shifts.” Mimeo, Catholic University of Leuven, 
Campus Kotijk.] 
Coelli T., D. Rao, C. J. O’Donnell, and G. E. Battese. 2005. An introduction to efficiency and 
productivity analysis, second ed. Springer. [[pls provide city of publication.]] 
Coelli, T., A. Estache, S. Perelman and L. Trujillo 2003. A Primer on Efficiency Measurement 
for Utilities and Transport Regulators, World Bank Institute Publications,  Studies in 
Development Series, Washington, DC  
Coelli and Perelman. 2000. “Technical efficiency of European railways: A Distance Function 
Approach”, Applied Economics 32(15): 1967-76 
Coelli and Perelman 1999 “A comparison of parametric and non-parametric distance 
functions: with application to European Railways”, European Journal of Operations 
Research 117(2): 1967-76 
Cuesta, R. A., and L. Orea . 2002. “Mergers and technical efficiency in Spanish saving banks: 
a stochastic distance function approach.” Journal of Banking and Finance 26: 2231–
47. 
Devarajan, S., V. Swaaroop, and H. Zou. 1996. “The composition of public expenditure and 
growth.” Journal of Monetary Economics 37: 313–344. 
Dreher, A., J. E. Sturm, and H. Ursprung. 2006. “The impact of globalization on the 
composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data.” CESifo 
Working Paper 1755. 
Fried, H., K. Lovell, and S. Schmidt, eds. 1993. The measurement of productive efficiency: 
Techniques and applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Gupta, S., and M. Verhoeven. 2001. “The efficiency of government expenditures: 
Experiences from Africa.” Journal of Policy Modeling 23: 433–67 
 24
Gupta, S., M. Verhoeven, and E. R. Tiongson. 2002. “The effectiveness of government 
spending on education and health care in developing and transition economies.” 
European Journal of Political Economy 18 (4): 717–37. 
Karras, G. 1996. “The optimal government size: further international evidence on the 
productivity of government services.” Economic Inquiry 34 (2): 193–203. 
Herrera, S., and G. Pang. 2005. “Efficiency of public spending in developing countries: An 
efficiency frontier approach.” World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 3645. 
Jayasuryia, R., and Q. Wodon. 2002. Efficiency in reaching the Millennium Development 
Goals. World Bank Working Paper 9, Washington, DC.  
Mayne, J. and E. Zapico-Goni, ed. 1997. Monitoring performance in the public sector—
Future directions from international experience. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Musgrove, P. 1996. “Public and private roles in health: Theory and financing patterns, World 
Bank Discussion Paper 339, Washington, DC. 
OECD. 2003. “Enhancing the cost effectiveness of public spending.” Economic Outlook, 
2003/02 (74). December. 
Pestieau, P. 2006. “Assessing the performance of the public sector.” Unpublished paper, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice Presidency, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Pradhan, S. 1996. “Evaluating public spending.” World Bank Discussion Paper 323, 
Washington, DC. 
Ravallion, M. 2005. “On measuring aggregate ‘social efficiency.’” Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 53 (2): 273–292. 
Ritter, C. and L. Simar 1997. "Pitfalls of normal-gamma stochastic frontier models", The 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 8, 167-182 
Sanz, I., and F. J. Velazquez. 2001. “The composition of public expenditure and growth: 
difference models of government expenditure distribution by functions.” Discussion 
Paper 0115, Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand. 
Shephard, R. W. 1953. Cost and production functions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
———. 1970. Theory of cost and production functions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Vandenberghe, V., and S. Robin. 2004. “Evaluating the effectiveness of private education 
across countries: a comparison of methods.” Labour Economics 11: 487–506. 
 25
WHO. 2005. WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS), available at http: 
//www3.who.int/whosis/core/core_select.cfm
 26
